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Reactive Power is a Cheap Constraint 
Edward Kahn * and Ross Baldick ** 
Hogan (1993) has proposed a version of marginal cost pricing for 
electricity transmission transactions that include a component for reactive power 
to support voltage at demand nodes . His examples support the notion that the 
cost of satisfying voltage constraints can be quite high . We show that in his 
simplest example the price on this constraint results from an uneconomic and 
artificial characterization of the problem, namely an inefficient and unnecessarily 
constrained dispatch . By eliminating this characterization, the price of reactive 
power falls to a very modest level . Our counterexample has implications for the 
institutional arrangements under which transmission pricing reform will take 
place . We believe that environment will be an open access competitive s tting, 
where dispatch is still controlled by one group of participants. Manipulation of 
marginal transmission costs becomes quite feasible in complex networks through 
subtle changes to dispatch . Therefore an open access regime using marginal cost 
pricing must involve either some kind of monitoring and audit function to detect 
potential abuses, or alternatively, institutional restructuring to eliminate conflicts 
of interest . 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasing reliance on market forces in electricity has focused attention 
on the crucial role of the transmission etwork. Unlike other network systems 
in natural gas, telecommunications or airlines, the electricity network is subject 
to real time physical constraints for which intuition is difficult o develop. 
Proposals to re-align the pricing and access conditions for electricity 
transmission must confront these physical constraints and treat them 
appropriately. The electrical engineering literature is replete with discussions of 
specific reliability problems that result in operational limitations on the use of 
the high voltage network (Stoll, 1989). In this paper, we focus on one widely 
applicable constraint, the limits of transmission line loadability due to voltage 
limits. Voltage limits are difficult for non-engineers, in part because there is an 
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abundance of terminology for the same things. For example, reactive power is 
the quantity that is said to be lacking when voltage is insufficient due to 
generator, transmission or load characteristics. Berg et al., (1983) is a good 
discussion from an economist's point of view. 
Engineers use the term "loadability 
" instead of capacity for transmission 
lines to reflect he operational effect of constraints on facility usage. For high 
voltage lines of 50 to 300 miles in length, voltage limits are the predominant 
constraint (Dunlop et al., 1979). In the economics literature, voltage limits have 
been discussed recently in the context of a particular transmission pricing 
proposal known as spot, locational or node pricing (Hogan, 1992,1993; 
Schweppe et al., 1988; Baughman and Siddiqi, 1991). We address our 
discussion to Hogan's exposition. 
The basic notion underlying the node pricing approach is that in an 
optimally dispatched network the cost differences between different odes in the 
grid reflect he value of transmission. Ifthere is abundant ransmission capacity 
between two points, the node prices should reflect only incremental losses. 
Where congestion occurs, differences in marginal generation costs between 
nodes also reflect he value of the congestion constraint. The effect of loadability 
limits is a particular form of congestion, which Hogan and others suggest should 
be included in the pricing. Where voltage limits are operative, this means 
putting a price on these limits. Hogan (1993) presents the case for such a price. 
His principal argument for this proposal is a series of increasingly complex 
examples which show that the voltage constraint has a high value. 
In this paper we examine Hogan's simplest example of a voltage 
constraint, based on a three node network. We show that this example violates 
the fundamental assumption of all the node pricing literature, namely that the 
network is optimally dispatched. We illustrate this problem by showing a lower 
cost dispatch that meets the same constraint. We use these examples to call into 
question the claim that node pricing can be implemented under current 
institutional arrangements. That is, while we agree with node pricing for short 
run allocation under the assumptions of information symmetry amongst 
participants and of infinite available computing resources, we question its 
practicality under prevailing institutional arrangements in the U.S.1 As the 
electricity industry in the U.S. is organized today, it is extremely difficult o 
know if a particular dispatch pattern is optimal, or if it reflects the presence of 
artificial constraints. The problem of information asymmetry in electricity 
transmission is profound and must be addressed in the arrangements for pricing 
and managing an open access regime. 
1. See Baldick, Kaye and Wu (1992) for a discussion fsome of these issues. 
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HOGAN'S EXAMPLES ARE NOT GENERIC 
To argue for the importance of reactive power pricing, Hogan uses 
examples of two kinds. The first is a simple triangular arrangement of lines with 
two generation odes (numbered 1 and 2) and one load node (numbered 3). 
Generation is cheaper at Node 1 than at Node 2. There are three links in this 
network: from 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 1 to 3. The link from 1 to 3 is the limited 
capacity line; the limit is due to low voltage at Node 3. This limit forces 
generation to the higher cost location at Node 2. Figure 1 shows this 
configuration, using Hogan' s representation of his voltage constrained case (this 
corresponds to his Figure 7). The purpose of using this simplest possible 
network topology is to illustrate basic phenomena in a pedagogic fashion. 
Subsequent examples, based on a more complex 38 node system are intended to 
show that the same qualitative phenomena illustrated in the simple case also 
appear in more realistic configurations. 
Figure 1. Hogan's Example: Loadflow 
(Real Power in MW, Reactive Power in MVar) {Voltage} 
[Real Power Price, Reactive Power Price] 
(57, 183){1.05} 1 3 (1340, 200){1.013} 
[1, 0] V ý. I1-44' 0-701 
"¡L (479, 126)  (467, 
/ 
(422, -57) '. у/ (872, 54) 
(431, -85) '. (909, 85) 
i  1 ¿ ÍA (1340, 0){1.064 } Totcil Cost = 1531 -j Q 
In Figure 1 a minimum voltage at Node 3 is specified. It is also 
common practice to specify maximum voltages. For the purposes of this initial 
discussion, we treat he voltages in Figure 1 as reliability requirements, and seek 
to replicate them. To reproduce the results in Figure 1, we use the same 
network parameters used by Hogan. These are given in our Appendix. Using 
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these parameters, and fixing generation at Nodes 1 and 2 as in Figure 1, we 
reproduce the line flows and voltages specified there. We performed these 
calculations using standard power flow software, which is readily available in 
a number of packages, and obtained Hogan's results to within round-off errors. 
It is important to notice that the generator at Node 2 produces no 
reactive power, even though the load point (Node 3) consumes 200 MVAr. We 
do not believe that there is a good reason for restricting reactive power 
production at Node 2. Such a restriction isartificial since generators produce the 
bundled product of both real and reactive power. There is a substitution between 
these components of the bundled product, i.e. more reactive power means less 
real power capacity, but in this case that is exactly what is required.2 By 
producing reactive power at Node 2, the voltage at Node 3 would be supported, 
allowing less reactive power production and more real power production at Node 
1. If there is some other constraint limiting reactive power production at Node 
2, then we do not have a voltage constraint, but some other kind of constraint. 
An example of this would be a stability limit. Since there is no indication of this 
in Hogan's discussion, then nothing should limit the more efficient dispatch 
strategy. Such a dispatch strategy will relieve the constraint on power flow over 
the line from Node 1 to Node 3, and lower the total cost by shifting eneration 
to Node 1. Our calculations how that a very substantial shift of this kind is 
possible. 
Before illustrating the effect of removing the artificial constraint on 
reactive power at Node 2, we must discuss Hogan's pricing algorithm. The basic 
theory of node pricing derives these prices from a formal optimization process. 
The power flow program used to produce Figure 1 does not produce such prices 
directly. Hogan describes a procedure he uses to derive prices from a power 
flow. We adopt the more natural procedure of embedding the problem in an 
optimal power flow framework. Optimal power flow (OPF) is a more complex 
calculation than ordinary power flow because it involves a simultaneous 
minimization of fuel costs along with satisfying the ordinary power flow 
constraints (Burchett et al., 1982; Gribik et al. 1991). OPF is not widely 
available in software packages. We used a research grade implementation 
developed at the University of Texas-Austin, which is adequate for our small 
network. 
Figure 2 shows the results of running the OPF subject to the following 
constraints: (1) voltage at node 1 is 1.05, (2) voltage at node 3 ^ 1.013, (3) 
voltage at node 2 <* 1.064, and (4) reactive power production at node 2 is zero, 
and (5) line 1 to 3 flow < 600 MVA. This figure includes the real and reactive 
power prices at each node. We adopt Hogan's assumption that the cost of power 
at node 1 is one monetary unit and the cost at node 2 is 1.1 monetary units. The 
2. This substitution is described inStoll (1989) and Berg et al. (1983), for example. 
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dispatch results differ marginally from Figure 1; slightly more real power is 
produced at Node 1 and less at Node 2. The result is a slightly lower total cost; 
1523 units in the case of Figure 2 compared to 1531 in Figure 1. The prices of 
real and reactive power at node 3 are quite similar to Hogan's results, 1.43 for 
real power and 0.67 for reactive power. 
Figure 2. Hogan's Example: OPF 
(113.5, 179.4X1.05} i 3 (1340.0,200.0){1.013} 
11, 0] V Л П-427, 0.6701 
¡Ц (498.3, 125.8)  
(466.0, 143'9^ 
y Á 
(384.7. -53£)^^' /(854.0, 56.1) 
(391.7, -84.3) Nv / (889.6, 84.3) 
i  1 -Л 2 Tolal Cos- 1523 | 
A COUNTER EXAMPLE 
Next, we remove the artificial constraint on reactive power production 
at node 2. This will mean less real power produced at this node due to the 
real/reactive power trade-off at a generator. But since node 2 production is 
expensive, this is consistent with economic dispatch without other constraints. 
The results are shown in Figure 3. 
This case shows much larger changes in dispatch, total cost and prices 
at Node 3 compared to Hogan's results and Figures 1 and 2. Between Figure 2 
and Figure 3, real power production at Node 2 declines by 337 MW. The 
increase at Node 1 is 329 MW, indicating that real losses have decreased. Total 
cost declines by 42 monetary units, or nearly 3 % . The real power price at Node 
3 falls from 1.43 to 1.31. The most dramatic change, however, is the reactive 
power price. It is now 0.04 compared to 0.67 in Figure 2. With the artificial 
constraint on reactive power removed, its value falls down to a level that is not 
large. 
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Figure 3. No Constraint on Reactive Power at Node 2: OPF 
(442.6, -60.4H1. 048} 1 3 (1340.0 200.0){1. 013} 
[1. 01 ' / f 
I' 314' 0 0381 
(605.8, 52.1)   (588.9, 60.6) ^ 
^4 / (751.1, 139.4) (163.2, 1 12.2) / 
(164.8, 70.8) N. (779.3, 152.6) 
,  nK 
2 (944.1, 223.4){1 .064} 
Totâl Cost = 1481 if -J Q Qj 
We believe that Figure 3 represents a far more generic situation in 
power systems than either Figures 1 or 2. Generators that are close to the load 
are typically older and less efficient than newer remote units. It is cheap to shift 
production at these sites from real to reactive power to allow increased 
production from the remote fficient units. This practice of "dispatching VArs 
close to the load" is referred to briefly in Hogan's exposition, but it is 
contradicted by his examples. 
In the case where there is insufficient reactive power available from 
generators that are close to the load, there are various planning solutions 
available to relieve voltage constraints. We briefly review how the voltage 
constraint appears in the contingency planning framework in the next section, 
and then discuss it from the planning perspective in the section after that. 
OPERATION UNDER CONTINGENCY 
The previous analysis is entirely static. It abstracts from the operating 
and reliability procedures typically used by power system engineers. Those 
procedures emphasize the operating responses that should be employed when an 
outage contingency occurs on the bulk power network. Nedwick, Mistr and 
Croadsale (1994) is a recent discussion of these issues that addresses reactive 
power constraints. That paper represents the design and operating philosophy of 
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Virginia Power, and reflects their recent experience with some extreme 
operating conditions. 
The basic approach these engineers take to reactive power planning is 
to use generating units as "reactive power reserve" for contingencies, and to 
supply all reactive requirements under normal operating conditions using low 
cost capacitor banks. The result is that generators may not produce much 
reactive power under normal conditions, but they are available to produce it in 
substantial quantities very quickly in emergencies. These procedures may look 
like a constraint on reactive power production in normal operation. That 
interpretation, however, is incorrect, and would not support what we have called 
the artificial constraint on reactive power at Node 2 in Hogan's example. The 
correct understanding of these dynamic procedures in a setting such as this is 
that there would be no net reactive demand at Node 3 to be supplied by 
generators, because it would all be met locally with capacitors. If somehow 
there was still such a demand, operating the units at Nodes 1 and 2 would not 
involve the asymmetric mposition of a reactive power constraint at only Node 
2. As argued in Section 2, any special constraint on reactive power at Node 2 
would have to arise from some other factor, such as a stability limit. In that 
case, we don't have a reactive power constraint, but we really have a stability 
constraint. 
It is worth commenting briefly about the style of analysis embodied in 
Figures 1-3. By characterizing the voltage problem as a static load flow, it is 
possible to compute shadow prices. In the dynamic, i.e. contingency planning, 
setting in which these problems typically arise, it is not nearly so simple a 
matter to compute a shadow price. As a practical matter, we know of no 
commercially available software to perform OPF under contingency, even for 
simple problems such as the three node cases we have examined here. 
Therefore, the match between the actual engineering problem and the pricing 
problem is highly stylized. While such stylizations can be useful, they lose all 
meaning if the wrong constraints get embedded in their formulation. 
REACTIVE POWER IS ALSO CHEAP IN THE PLANNING DOMAIN 
Baldick and Kahn (1993b) use a triangle model much like the previous 
examples to analyze a voltage limited transmission constraint from the planning 
perspective. That analysis is motivated by a real case in which a large regional 
utility is proposing to reinforce a constrained transmission corridor. The transfer 
capacity over the corridor is limited by voltage minima under line outage 
contingencies (APCo, 1991). In the general case, where an increase in demand 
at the load center can be met by generation at a low cost remote node, at a 
higher cost intermediate node, or by the most expensive generation at the load, 
optimal choices depend on trade-offs involving the differences in generation 
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costs between sites, the cost of added transmission capacity, and the cost of 
reactive power compensation equipment. As we have indicated, reactive power 
capacity is available from an electric generator in addition to real power: 
generators produce the bundled product of real and reactive power. Additional 
reactive power can also be produced as a single product by compensation 
equipment such as capacitors. 
There is a wide range of reactive power compensation equipment from 
low cost fixed capacitors to more expensive devices known as static VAr 
compensators. The capital cost of such equipment is typically no more than 
$50/kV, and the operating cost is minimal. This is roughly 1 % of the lifecycle 
costs of baseload electric generation. Each kVA of local reactive power 
generation typically relieves transmission capacity from a remote generator by 
between 0.3 and 1 kW, depending upon many issues including load power factor 
(Stoll, 1989; Baldick and Kahn, 1993b). 
Voltage limits can be relieved by compensation equipment only up to 
the minimum of the stability and thermal limits on the capacity of transmission 
lines. If remote generation is very much cheaper than local alternatives and 
transmission is already fully compensated, then transmission reinforcement may 
be appropriate. Costs of new high voltage transmission lines are on the order of 
$l/kW-mile, so a 200 mile line (roughly appropriate for the voltage limited 
case) would cost $200/kW. Other types of reinforcement may be more or less 
expensive. For example, estimates made by the Southern California Edison 
Company (1993) are seldom in excess of $300/kW, and more frequently less 
than $100/kW, depending on location. 
Finally, there are cases in which the cost differences between remote 
and local generation may be on the order of $100-300/kW. In such cases, higher 
cost local generation may be preferable to remote generation, when the voltage 
support benefits are appropriately assessed. If we assume that the high end of 
this range is a high estimate of the costs of the reactive power constraint, his 
would still be only about 6 % of the lifecycle cost of baseload generation. 
Knowing which option is preferable in individual cases requires detailed 
study. Lumpiness in both generation and transmission capacity will complicate 
economic analysis (Baldick and Kahn, 1993a). Broadly speaking, however, the 
alternatives for relieving voltage constraints are abundant and not expensive. The 
examples offered by Hogan where the reactive power constraint is 70-300% of 
real power costs is one to two orders of magnitude too high. As we have shown 
by our counterexample in Section 3, these estimates may indicate more that the 
grid is sub-optimally dispatched rather than that voltage constraints are 
expensive. 
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INFORMATION PROBLEMS AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
The point of these examples is that even in simple cases transmission 
costs are complex. In real networks, there is an enormous asymmetry in 
information between the transmission owner and any other party. This applies 
to potential competitors, customers, and regulators. In the "club" system of 
network co-ordination among transmission owning utilities, there is an 
information equilibrium of checks and balances that prevents one utility from 
exploiting others. This is described by Walton (1993) with particular reference 
to planning procedures in the Western Systems Coordinating Council. An open 
access regime, however, introduces more competition. This creates conflicts of 
interest between the transmission owner and wholesale competitors. Experience 
with such competition where dispatch and operating issues are concerned shows 
that information manipulation through the vehicle of complex computer models 
is a standard part of the strategic gaming (Kahn, to appear). 
Since node pricing is proposed for use in a competitive open access 
system, there is some question about whether the optimality claims of such a 
pricing arrangement will be realized in practice. Hogan (1992) suggests that 
implementation of node pricing need not require any change in current 
institutional arrangements. Others, such as Frame (1992), who does not endorse 
this method, question whether this is the case. Ruff (1994), who does endorse 
node pricing, appears to recognize that restructuring institutions will be required 
to implement this kind of market. 
Our examples show why an audit function must be part of any node 
pricing arrangement absent any more complete restructuring. They also argue 
for joint planning arrangements. Audit is necessary to detect cases such as those 
illustrated by Figures 1 and 2, where operating procedures that are inefficient 
result in high marginal price signals that do not reflect true scarcity or 
congestion. Whereas the artificial constraint was relatively easy to detect in the 
simple three node system, it would be much more difficult o detect such 
constraints in a realistic system. Joint planning arrangements at the regional 
level, with full participation by independent producers and consumers, might 
also help to detect global inefficiencies that result from sub-optimization at the 
individual control area level. 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) implementation of the 
Energy Policy Act will go part of the way toward addressing these issues. In 
particular, the Final Rule on transmission information requires utilities to 
provide extensive transmission system information a d marginal generation cost 
data (not disaggregated by location) (FERC, 1993a). To create genuine checks 
and balances, however, information must be used in a setting that can discipline 
behavior. The most promising alternative for such a setting is the notion of a 
Regional Transmission Group (RTG). There has been much discussion of RTGs 
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as an information exchange/dispute resolution forum where all interested parties 
could negotiate matters of common concern. The tasks facing such organizations 
are formidable (Kahn, 1994), including satisfying FERC that they are behaving 
appropriately (FERC, 1993b). It is not clear whether RTGs might evolve toward 
providing the kind of wholesale electricity institutions needed for an efficient 
open access regime. Others have argued that non-discriminatory treatment of 
operating constraints under open access will require a major restructuring 
(Graves et al., 1993). Open access in electricity transmission will require an 
unbundling and examination of the entire electricity cost structure so that 
agreement about the true costs of complex constraints can be reached. Existing 
institutions may well not be adequate to this task. 
APPENDIX 
The network parameters used are given in per unit with respect to a 
base of 100 MVA and 1.0 per unit V (Bergen, 1986). Each of the three lines 
has the parameters given in the table. 
Table 1. Electrical Parameters for Triangle Examples 
Series Parameters Shunt Parameters 
Resistance (R) Inductive Conductance (G) Capacitive 
Reactance (X) Susceptance (B)
0.005 0.010 0.000 0.400 
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